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SUMMARY OF REPLY
The plaintiffs' brief is like a ship passing in the night.
It never touches the principal arguments raised in the defendants'
brief because it begs the central questions in this action—
namely,

whether

Froerer

Corp.

assumed

Ranch

Liquidators'

obligations under the Purchase Agreement and whether the deed
from Ranch Liquidators conveyed clear title to Froerer Corp. or
was meant only as security.

The plaintiffs continue to proceed

under the false premise that Froerer Corp. somehow purchased
the

Property

from

and

assumed

the

obligations

of

Ranch

Liquidators of Utah, Inc. when the Purchase Agreement was assigned
to Froerer Corp. on June 11, 1980.

The only theory presented

in plaintiffs' brief to support the trial court's conclusion—
that defendants are liable to plaintiffs—is that Froerer Corp.
bought the Property from Ranch Liquidators with the knowledge
of plaintiffs' interest in the Property and, therefore, took
the Property impressed with an equitable trust.

However, as

already demonstrated in defendant's brief, there is no factual
or legal support for plaintiffs' position or the trial court's
entry of summary judgment.

Notwithstanding the trial court's

ruling that "the facts are undisputed and the decision turns
on the legal effect of the docum[e]nt of contract and conveyance,"

- 1 -

genuine issues of material fact exist, and, as a matter of law,
plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment.
In this Reply Brief, defendants will demonstrate that the
trial court's summary judgment was erroneous and, in critical
respects, unsupported

or directly controverted

by competent

evidence from an otherwise limited record.
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Throughout their initial brief, defendants contended that
the trial court erred

in granting summary

judgment

to the

plaintiffs because there were several genuine issues of material
fact still left to be resolved. The plaintiffs present, at pages
1-3 of their brief, their version of the facts.

Their argument

follows logically (if not coherently) from their version of the
facts, but the argument begs the central questions in this appeal
by assuming, without any unambiguous evidence to support them,
the very facts that the defendants have disputed.
Apart from the inaccurate citations to the Addendum1
the defendants do not dispute paragraphs 1 through 3 of the
plaintiffs' statement of facts.

1

The plaintiffs' brief is confusing in part because of
their inaccurate citation to the Addendum.
The documents
plaintiffs cite to in their brief do not accurately correspond
to the lettered Addendum.
- 2 -

In response to paragraph 4, the defendants do not
dispute that Ranch Liquidators received $80,000 from Froerer
Corp. for an assignment of Ranch Liquidators' right to receive
future contract payments and that the 23 contract receivables
had a total principal balance of about $149,000. Moreover, they
do not dispute that Fred Froerer acquired a commitment for title
insurance (Addendum "B" to plaintiffs' brief), but deny that
Froerer felt that it indicated title in them.

The commitment

shows title in Louis B. and Lillian C. Ellsworth as trustees of
the Louis B. Ellsworth and Lillian C. Ellsworth Trust, and
Fredrick Froerer III (Fred Froerer's son) testified that he could
not say what the corporation (Froerer Corp.) thought or knew
about title to the Property.
III at 12.

Deposition of Frederick Froerer

He also testified that his understanding was that

title to the Property was in Basin Land & Title, as trustee under
the purchase agreement between Ranch Liquidators of Utah and
the Ellsworths as sellers.

Id. at 13-14.2

Although there is

no evidence that Fred Froerer actually obtained title insurance,
it would not be inconsistent with the defendants' position if
he did.

The defendants do not contend that they had no interest

in the Property.

They contend that they had a security interest

2 Although Mr. Froerer said that at the time of the
commitment Mwe are in title," Deposition of Fredrick Froerer
III at 11, this appears to be a slip of the tongue because the
preceding sentence indicates that the Ellsworths were in title,
as shown by the commitment.
- 3 -

in the Property, in other words, a mortgage, and it is common
practice for a lender-mortgagee to obtain title insurance to
protect its security interest in land.
The defendants do not dispute paragraphs 5 and 6 of
the plaintiffs' statements of facts.

However, the fact that

Froerer Corp. executed and recorded a Notice of Assignment of
Contracts at worst is neutral and at best supports the defendants'
factual theory, not the plaintiffs'.

The notice is neutral in

that it does not say what Froerer Corp. 's interest in the Property
is. The notice is as consistent with a claimed security interest
as it is with any alleged fee interest.

In fact, the notice

states that Froerer Corp. claims an interest in the Property
"by virtue of certain Assignments of Real Estate Contracts,"
not by virtue of any deed, suggesting that Froerer Corp.'s
interest in the Property was as security for the assignments and
not any fee interest. If Froerer Corp. had claimed a fee interest
in the Property, it would have recorded the Warranty Deed, which
would have been much simpler than creating a new document, and
not a Notice of Assignment of Contracts.

Froerer Corp. never

did record the Warranty Deed. Clearly, the Notice of Assignment
of Contracts was meant to show those dealing with the Property
that Froerer Corp. —

not Ranch Liquidators —

had the right to

receive payments under the real estate contracts.

- 4 -

It was not

intended as notice of any fee interest in the Property since
Froerer Corp. did not have such an interest.
In response to paragraph 7, the defendants do not dispute that they received the Winegars' payments from June 1980
until the contract was paid in full. However, Ranch Liquidators
received the Winegars' payments for the previous eleven months.
Moreover, Froerer Corp. did not record the Warranty Deed or the
Quit-Claim Deed.

The Warranty Deed and Quit-Claim Deed show

that they were both recorded at the request of "A. Wayne Winegar."
See Brief of Respondents, Addenda "E" and "I"; Deposition of
Frederick Froerer, III, p. 36. Froerer Corp. also strongly disputes that it ever had an obligation to convey clear title to
the plaintiffs.

(See Appellants Brief, pp. 5-6.)

Finally, at paragraph 8 of the Statement of Facts,
plaintiffs highlight the central issue involved in this case,
namely, whether or not Froerer Corp. intended to assume Ranch
Liquidators' obligations under the Purchase Agreement.

The

defendants maintain that Froerer Corp. never intended to assume
any of Ranch Liquidators' obligations.

Because intent is a

question of fact, the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in plaintiffs' favor.

- 5 -

ARGUMENT
I.

THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ONLY ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IF THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACTS AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOWED
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that this Court does not have to
accord any deference to the trial court's conclusions concerning
whether the material facts are in dispute. Nor do the plaintiffs
dispute that this Court must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.

Contrary to the plaintiffs'

assertion—that the documents unambiguously obligated defendants
to convey title to the Property and that the defendants' failure
to do so entitles plaintiffs to rescission of the Purchase
Agreement—the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
because, under the facts viewed in the light most favorable to
the defendants, the defendants never purchased the Property or
became obligated to convey title to plaintiffs.
II.

THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT BE LIABLE FOR BREACH
OF CONTRACT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT A PARTY
TO THE PURCHASE CONTRACT, AND THEY DID NOT
ASSUME RANCH LIQUIDATORS' LIABILITIES UNDER
THE PURCHASE CONTRACT.

The central issues of this case focus upon the Court's interpretation of the Assignment, whereby Ranch Liquidators assigned
the Purchase Contract to Froerer Corp. The first issue is whether

- 6 -

Froerer Corp. assumed Ranch Liquidators' obligation to convey
title in the Property to plaintiffs under the Purchase Agreement.
If the parties intended Froerer Corp. to assume Ranch Liquidators'
obligation, then the defendants may have had an obligation to
convey title to the plaintiffs.

On the other hand, if the par-

ties did not intend defendants to assume Ranch Liquidators' obligations, then there was no obligation to convey the Property
to plaintiffs.

The parties' intent, however, is a question of

fact.
The

second

issue

is

whether

the

Assignment

and

the

contemporaneous delivery of the Warranty Deed to Froerer Corp.
constituted a purchase of the Property, thereby creating a trust
in favor of the plaintiffs.

In other words, was the deed meant

as a conveyance or a mortgage?

Again, if the parties intended

the deed to be a present conveyance of fee title, then defendants
may have had an obligation to convey title.

In contrast, if

the deed was meant as a mortgage, then no such obligation arose.3
The plaintiffs confuse these two issues by simply arguing
in Points I-IV of their brief that the Assignment was a purchase
of the Property and, therefore, an assumption of Ranch Liquidators' obligations.

The law, however, does not impose such li-

ability upon an assignee unless expressly stated in the contract.

Defendants address the second issue in Point IV, infra.
- 7 -

Froerer Corp. never assumed Ranch Liquidators' liability,
but only took an assignment of Ranch Liquidators' right to future
payments under the Purchase Agreement, i.e., Ranch Liquidators'
contract receivables.

The Assignment is devoid of any language

which implies an assumption of Ranch Liquidators' liabilities.
Cf. Murr v. Selaa Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 747 P.2d 1302, 1309 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1987); see also Cuchine v. H.O. Bell, Inc. 682 P.2d
723, 725 (Mont. 1984) (assignee's assumption of liability must
be clearly shown); Treasure Valley Bank v. Long, 92 Or. App.
598, 759 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1988) (assignee did not assume assignor's obligation because assignment did not contain any language
to the effect that assignee agreed to assume or not assume obligations) .
Moreover, the Assignment provides that Froerer Corp. accepted
it "subject to" the covenants and conditions contained in the
Purchase Agreement.

(Record at 44.)

"A purchaser taking realty

subject to an encumbrance 'does not necessarily assume a personal
obligation to pay it'". Arizona Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Smith,
21 Ariz. App. 371, 519 P.2d 860, 863 (1974); see also, S.L.
Nusbaum & Co. v. Atlantic Va. Realty Corp., 206 Va. 673, 146
S.E.2d 205, 209 (1966) (assignment must clearly show an intent
to assume the assignor's liability).

Because the Assignment

does not contain any assumption language, the responsibility of
conveying clear title to plaintiffs remains the obligation of

- 8 -

Ranch Liquidators*

Therefore, defendants cannot, as a matter

of law, be held liable for Ranch Liquidators' failure to convey,
and the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for
summary j udgment•
III. IF THE ASSIGNMENT WAS AMBIGUOUS, EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE WAS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THE PARTIES
INTENT.
Interestingly, plaintiffs do not dispute that absent an
express assumption of liability, an assignment of a contract
does

not

impose

on the assignee the assignor's

liabilities under the contract.

duties or

(See Brief of Respondents, p.

12.) Despite the absence of an express assumption of liability,
plaintiffs contend that by the Assignment the parties clearly and
unambiguously intended that Froerer Corp. would assume Ranch
Liquidators' obligations.

Plaintiffs, however, fail to refer

this court to any direct or circumstantial evidence in the record
to support this assertion. Thus, at the very least there exists
a disputed issue of material fact concerning what the parties
intended by the Assignment.
The only extrinsic evidence before the trial court was the
Affidavit of Frederick Froerer, III, which supported the conclusion that Froerer Corp. never intended to assume Ranch Liquidators' obligations.

(See Affidavit of Frederick Froerer, III;

Record at 73-74.) The trial court was required to draw all rea-

- 9 -

sonable inferences in favor of defendants, see Bowen v. Riverton
City, 656 P. 2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982), and its failure to draw
such an inference in this case was error.
IV.

FROERER CORP. DID NOT BUY THE PROPERTY FROM
RANCH LIQUIDATORS AND THEREFORE HAD NO OBLIGATION TO CONVEY.

As noted above, the only argument plaintiffs proffer in
support of the trial court's summary judgment is that the defendants purchased the Property from Ranch Liquidators with
knowledge of the plaintiffs' interest in the Property, thereby
imposing a trust in favor of the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs

justify the trial court's decision by asserting that Ranch
Liquidators' delivery of, and Froerer Corp.'s subsequent recording
of the Warranty Deed,4 manifested an intention to convey title
to Froerer Corp.^

4

Plaintiffs mistakenly assert that the Warranty Deed
and Quit-Claim Deed were recorded by Froerer Corp. A simple
review of the documents, Addendum "E" and "I" to plaintiffs'
brief, reveals they were recorded at the request of "A. Wayne
Winegar", a plaintiff in this action. See also Deposition of
Frederick Froerer, III, pp. 18, 36.
5
Plaintiffs state that "[t]here is absolutely no evidence
that Ranch Liquidators intended anything other than to deed absolute title to Froerer." (Brief of Respondents, p. 15). In fact,
there is no evidence one way or the other of Ranch Liquidators'
intent, but the evidence of Froerer Corp.'s intent, including
the testimony of Fredrick Froerer III and the fact that Froerer
Corp. did not record the deed, shows that Froerer Corp. did not
accept the deed as a conveyance of "absolute title."

- 10 -

Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, Froerer Corp. did not
purchase the Property from Ranch Liquidators, thereby imposing
an equitable trust in plaintiffs' favor.

What Froerer Corp.

purchased was the right to receive contract payments, i.e., account receivables. The Warranty Deed was given to Froerer Corp.
as security for its future right to receive the payments.6 Moreover, the Warranty Deed was delivered to Froerer Corp. contemporaneously with the Assignment.
plaintiffs' brief.)

(See Addenda "D" and "E" to

Plaintiffs would have this Court believe

that such a delivery showed an intent on the part of Ranch Liquidators to convey title.

However, the mere giving of a warranty

deed is not dispositive of the parties' intent. When a warranty
deed is given contemporaneously with a written agreement between
the parties, the transaction may be a mortgage if that was the
parties' intent.

Bvbee v. Stewart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118,

122 (1948); see also Kiar v. Brimlev, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d
23, 25-26 (1972) (a mortgage may consist of a warranty deed and
a separate contract in writing).
as

this,

In an equitable action such

in which the plaintiffs

sought

and were awarded

rescission, parol evidence is admissible to show the intent of
6
Throughout his deposition, Frederick Froerer, III
testified that it had been his understanding that Froerer Corp.
was acquiring nothing more than Ranch Liquidator's contract
receivables. (Froerer Depo., pp. 7-9, 25-26, 30, 35, 37.) He
further testified that "it was my understanding that the [Warranty
Deed] was for the purpose of being used in the event of default."
(Froerer Depo., p. 28.)
- 11 -

the parties to a deed absolute on its face.
122.

Bybee, 189 P.2d at

There is simply no evidence of Ranch Liquidators' intent,

and all the evidence of Froerer Corp.'s intent shows that the
transaction was meant as a mortgage.
The Assignment states that "a warranty deed covering the
property described is executed and delivered herewith in favor
of [Froerer Corp]."

This language is as consistent with the

defendants' interpretation that the Warranty Deed was given to
secure future contract payments, as it is with the plaintiffs'
(i.e., that the deed conveyed fee title).

On the plaintiffs'

motion for summary judgment, the trial court was required to
view the facts in the light most favorable to the defendants
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the defendants'
interpretation.
At the very least, the Assignment creates an ambiguity as
to what Ranch Liquidators' intent was in delivering the Warranty
Deed to Froerer Corp.

As noted above, if the Assignment was

ambiguous, then the trial court was required to determine the
parties' intent from evidence other than the Assignment.

Big

Butte Ranch. Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977).

The

only direct evidence before the trial court concerning whether
or not the parties (Ranch Liquidators and Froerer Corp.) intended
the Warranty Deed to be a conveyance of title or simply security

- 12 -

was the deposition testimony of Frederick Froerer.

(See footnote

6, supra).
In addition to Mr. Froerer's direct testimony, however,
there was other circumstantial evidence to support the conclusion
that the Warranty Deed was given as security and not as a conveyance of title.

In particular, Ranch Liquidators always retained

the legal right to convey the Property, which it did by quit-claim
deed to Mecca Enterprises on March 24, 1982, almost two years
after it assigned the rights to receive contract payments to
Froerer Corp.

See Bybee, 189 P.2d at 122 (fact that grantor

had right to sell land to third person indicates the intention
of parties that title should not pass to the grantee); Powell
v. Bastian, 541 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1975) (Justice Maughan
dissenting). Moreover, Froerer Corp. never exercised any ownership rights over the Property or claimed any benefits from the
Purchase Agreement other than receiving the contract payments.
When the plaintiffs first requested Froerer Corp. to deliver a
Warranty Deed, Mr. Froerer immediately informed plaintiffs they
would have to obtain the Warranty Deed from Ranch Liquidators.
Clearly, Froerer Corp. never intended to acquire title to the
Property, and one could certainly infer as much from the documents
and the parties' conduct.

The trial court erred in failing to

draw that inference, which defendants were entitled to on the

- 13 -

plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

See Bowen, 656 P.2d

at 436.
Regardless of the foregoing, the plaintiffs ignore the
Assignment by asserting that Ranch Liquidators' delivery of the
Warranty

Deed

was

conveyance of title.

all that was necessary

to complete

the

(See Brief of Respondents, pp. 5-12.) As

noted in the defendant's initial brief, however, a conveyance
of real property to be effective requires the delivery of a deed
with the intent of transferring ownership.

Given v. Lambeth,

10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 961 (1960).

There must also be

an acceptance on the part of the grantee. B-T Ltd. v. Blackman,
705 P.2d 307, 312 (Wyo. 1985). Without both delivery and acceptance, no conveyance is complete.
It is undisputed that Ranch Liquidators delivered a Warranty
Deed to Froerer Corp. which Froerer Corp. held pending the full
payment of the Purchase Agreement.?

The mere fact Froerer Corp.

retained possession of the Warranty Deed does not in and of itself
acknowledge acceptance of the deed, thereby divesting Ranch Liquidators of ownership.

It is undisputed that Froerer Corp. has

?
At page 15 of their Brief plaintiffs argue Froerer
Corp. 's failure to record the Warranty Deed is fatal to its argument that the deed was intended as security. Plaintiffs further
ask the court, "Why should Froerer be rewarded for their
negligence in failing to record their deed." (Brief of
Respondents, p. 14.)
However, the same may be asked of
plaintiffs, who could easily have recorded a Notice of Interest,
thereby putting all prospective purchasers on notice of their
own interest in the Property.
- 14 -

never conveyed or mortgaged the Property, recorded the Warranty
Deed**, or otherwise exercised any rights of ownership over the
Property.

See Bybee, 189 P.2d at 122; Powell, 541 P.2d at 1831.

Based upon the facts evaluated in the light most favorable to
the defendants, a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether or not delivery of the Warranty Deed contemporaneously with the Assignment, constituted a conveyance of title.
Defendants contend that it did not constitute a conveyance, and
for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the trial court
was obligated to draw the same inference.
Finally, in an attempt to buttress the trial court's decision, plaintiffs contend that the Property was impressed with
a trust in plaintiffs' favor and that Froerer Corp. was under
an obligation to complete the Purchase Agreement and convey the
Property to plaintiffs.

For the reasons set forth above—that

Froerer Corp. did not buy the Property, but only the right to
receive contract payments—this Court does not need to consider
the issue of whether an equitable trust was created.

In every

case plaintiffs cite in support of their conclusion that an
equitable trust was created, it was undisputed that the assignee
had purchased the property. In this case, there remains a factual
dispute concerning whether Froerer Corp. intended to purchase

B

The Warranty Deed was recorded at the request of the
plaintiff, A. Wayne Winegar, not the defendants.
- 15 -

the Property or just contract payments. Based upon that factual
dispute, defendants were entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn in their favor, and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
V.

THE PLAINTIFFS' RECORDING OF A QUIT-CLAIM
DEED RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFFS HAD WAIVED ANY CLAIM
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, PRECLUDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

At pages 16-17 of their brief, defendants address the trial
court's error concerning plaintiff's waiver of their claims
against defendants by recording the Quit-Claim Deed. Other than
asserting that "their [sic] was no inference of any waiver by
Winegars in any action they took," plaintiffs fail to identify
any evidence from the record to support the trial court's apparent
conclusion that the plaintiffs did not waive any of their claims
against the defendants. Consequently, a genuine issue of material
fact continues to exist concerning whether or not plaintiffs'
acceptance and recording of the Quit-Claim Deed constituted a
waiver of their claims against defendants.

- 16 -

VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS RESCISSION BECAUSE ALL OF THE PARTIES
TO THE CONTRACT WERE NOT BEFORE THE COURT,
AND THOSE BEFORE THE COURT COULD NOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR STATUS QUO.

The plaintiffs concur with defendants that an essential
purpose of rescission is to restore the parties to their status
quo prior to entering into the contract. See Briqqer v. Liddell,
699 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1985).

The plaintiffs, however, misun-

derstand the concept of rescission by asserting that the only
parties who need to be returned to the status quo are themselves.
This understanding is contrary to Utah law.

See id. (the fourth

element necessary for rescission is that it must be possible to
give rescission without serious prejudice to other party).

It

is incumbent upon plaintiffs to prove that the parties will not
be put in a worse position than before the transaction occurred.
Plaintiffs have wholly failed to meet their burden of proof.
Instead, plaintiffs simply argue that they should not be the
ones to shoulder the loss based upon Ranch Liquidators' failure
to convey clear title.9
y

Plaintiffs also argue, at page 19 of their Brief, that
because Froerer Corp. purchased the right to receive contract
payments at a discounted price, rescission is appropriate. This
argument is without merit. First, plaintiffs fail to take into
consideration the time value of money. Generally, anyone purchasing a contract receivable will pay a discounted rate for a
future income flow. Secondly, plaintiffs inaccurately calculate
the discount. The payment of $80,000 to Ranch Liquidators represented a discount of approximately forty-six percent (46%), not
fifty-four percent (54%) as alleged by plaintiffs. Given the
- 17 -

As noted at Points II and IV of their brief, defendants
neither assumed Ranch Liquidators' obligations under the Purchase
Agreement nor purchased the Property. Plaintiffs' reliance upon
77 Am. Jur. 2d Rescission § 247 and Miller v. Beck, 72 Or. 140,
142 P. 603, is misplaced.

Those authorities only apply if the

assignee accepted the deed conveying title.

Froerer Corp. did

not accept the deed or become a party to the Purchase Agreement;
therefore, the trial court erred in granting rescission since
Froerer Corp. could not be returned to its status quo.
VII. EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT WERE OTHERWISE CORRECT
IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT ERRED IN
GRANTING JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE
FULL AMOUNT OF THEIR CLAIM.
Plaintiffs acknowledge at page 20 of their brief that Froerer
Corp. did not receive all the payments under the Purchase
Agreement. ^

Plaintiffs do not dispute that in an action for

rescission, a party is only liable for the consideration or benefits received under the contract.

See McGraw v. Aylino fin re

Bell & BeckwithK 54 Bankr. 303, 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
time over which Froerer Corp. was to receive the money and the
likelihood that it would not receive all of the money, such a
discount rate was not unreasonable and did not give Froerer Corp.
any windfall, as the plaintiffs imply.
10 Plaintiffs again imply that because Froerer Corp.
purchased the contract payments at a discounted rate, Froerer
Corp. should bear the financial burden of that discount.
Plaintiffs, however, fail to consider the time value of money
and cite absolutely no legal authority in support of their position.
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For the reasons identified in defendant's initial brief, the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment against defendants
for the full amount of plaintiffs' claim.
CONCLUSION
Throughout their brief, plaintiffs rely exclusively on the
argument that because Froerer Corp. purchased the Property, they
assumed Ranch Liquidators' obligations to convey clear title
to them. Plaintiffs, however, ignore the uncontroverted evidence
that Froerer Corp. never intended to assume Ranch Liquidators'
obligations under the Purchase Agreement or exercise any rights
of ownership over the Property.

Because Froerer Corp. neither

assumed Ranch Liquidators' obligations nor purchased the Property,
the defendants did not have an obligation to deliver clear title
to the plaintiffs. At the very least, Froerer Corp.'s intention
in taking a Warranty Deed from Ranch Liquidators was a material
question of fact that precluded summary judgment.

The same is

true with regard to plaintiffs' intentions in recording the QuitClaim Deed and whether such recording constituted a waiver on
the part of the plaintiffs.

The trial court further erred in

granting plaintiffs rescission when defendants could not be
returned to their status quo.

Finally, since the undisputed

evidence shows that the defendants did not receive all of the
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plaintiffs' payments, the trial court erred in granting judgment for the full amount of their claims.
For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision
should be reversed and this action remanded for further proceedings .
DATED this ^

day of March, 1990.

DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ.
PAUL M. SIMMONS, ESQ.
MARK R. GAYLORD, ESQ.
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants
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